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Abstract
We study how changes in the maximum benet duration aect the inow into
unemployment in the Netherlands. Until August 2003, workers who became un-
employed after age 57.5 were entitled to unemployment benets until the age of
65, after which they would receive old age pensions. This characteristic made it
attractive for workers to enter unemployment shortly after age 57.5 rather than
shortly before. Indeed, we nd a peak in the inow into unemployment for workers
after age 57.5. From August 2003 onwards the maximum benet durations were
reduced. We nd that shortly after 2003 the peak in the inow disappeared.
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1 Introduction
Empirical research on the eects of unemployment insurance (UI) usually
focuses on potential outow eects. High levels and long durations of unem-
ployment benets provide little incentives for unemployed workers to nd
a job quickly. Therefore, unemployment durations increase with both the
level and the duration of the unemployment benets. However, unemploy-
ment benets may also aect the inow into unemployment. If the level of
benets goes up or the maximum benet duration increases it may be more
attractive for workers to enter unemployment and collect unemployment
benets.
The focus of this paper is on the unemployment inow eects of a reduc-
tion of the maximum unemployment benet duration in The Netherlands.
Until August 2003, if workers became unemployed after age 57.5 they were
entitled to unemployment benets until the age of 65, after which they would
receive old age pensions. This characteristic made it attractive for workers
to enter unemployment shortly after they became 57.5 rather than shortly
before. From August 2003 onwards the maximum benet durations were
reduced. This reduction removed the incentive for workers to enter unem-
ployment shortly after age 57.5 rather than before that age. The policy
change gives us the opportunity to investigate the eects of the incentives
that inuence inow into unemployment. We nd that until August 2003
there was an age-specic spike in the inow into unemployment. This spike
slowly disappeared after August 2003. Apparently workers have some inu-
ence on the timing of their unemployment spell and when possible they use
this inuence to their advantage.
The paper is set-up as follows. In section 2 we present a brief overview of
previous studies on the relationship between the duration of UI benets and
inow into unemployment. Section 3 describes the main characteristics of
the Dutch UI system and the data we use in our analysis. Section 4 presents
our parameter estimates and section 5 concludes.2 Previous studies 3
2 Previous studies
Empirical studies on the unemployment inow eect of the maximum bene-
t duration are rare. Most of the inow studies focus on requirements con-
cerning entrance into unemployment insurance. Christodes and McKenna
(1995) and Christodes and McKenna (1996) for example nd a clear re-
lationship between entrance requirements of Canadian UI and employment
durations. The exit rate from employment to unemployment increases sub-
stantially as soon as the workers satisfy the number of weeks worked in order
to qualify for UI benets. Andersen and Meyer (1997) investigate the take
up rate of unemployment benet insurance of workers separating from their
employer. They nd that both the level and the maximum duration of ben-
ets have a signicant positive eect. Green and Riddell (1997) study the
eect of changes on entrance requirements on the inow into Canadian un-
employment nding that changes in entrance requirements have a signicant
impact on employment durations. They also nd that many employment
spells that just qualify under the old system are extended to just qualify un-
der the new system. And they nd that all of the response is in layos, not
quits, which suggest that employers play an important role in the adjust-
ment of employment durations. Green and Sargent (1998) analyze Canadian
data and also nd evidence of concentrations of job spell durations at the
entrance requirement point and at the point at which individuals have qual-
ied for the maximum possible weeks of UI receipts. Winter-Ebmer (2003)
also looks at Austria around 1990 and nds an increase in the inow into
unemployment of older workers after an increase in the potential benet du-
ration. These Austrian older workers face incentives similar to those faced
by the Dutch older workers. The very generous increase also allowed for
them to move into unemployment as an early retirement paid by the state.
This is also conrmed by Lalive and Zweimuller (2003). They nd even
that the eects are particulary strong around the end of the duration of the
extension program. Finally, Lalive et al. (2006) also study the Austrian situ-
ation, where there was an increase in the potential benet duration for some3 Dutch unemployment insurance 4
groups of unemployed workers. One of those groups is workers aged above
50. They show that the induced increase in the steady-state unemployment
rate is caused mostly by an increase in the inow into unemployment.
3 Dutch unemployment insurance
3.1 Characteristic of the system
In the Netherlands, workers are entitled to UI benets if they become in-
voluntarily unemployed and lose their earnings for at least 5 or half of their
working hours. They must have been employed for at least 26 consecu-
tive weeks out of the 39 weeks prior to unemployment (26 out of 39 weeks
condition). Excluded from UI-benets are individuals who receive fulltime
disability benets or have reached the age of 65. Benets end when individ-
uals are no longer unemployed or reach the maximum benet duration. The
potential benet duration (PBD) and the benet level depend on the type
of UI-benets that can be collected. Individuals may be eligible for short
term benets, wage dependent benets or extended benets. Eligibility for
these three benet types depends on labor experience and the age at which
the individual becomes unemployed.
If an unemployed individual meets the 26 out of 39 weeks condition and
has also received wages for at least 52 days in the 4 calendar years during the
5 years prior to unemployment (4 out of 5 years condition), he or she qualies
for wage dependent benets. These benets last for at least 6 months and
are extended with 3 months to 4.5 years, depending on labor experience.
Labor experience is calculated as the number of years in the 5 calendar
years prior to unemployment in which the individual has received wages for
at least 52 days, plus the number of calendar years between the year that
the individual turned 18 and the 5 years prior to unemployment. As a result
of the 4 out of 5 years condition, the PBD for wage related benets depends
almost completely on the age at which the individual becomes unemployed.
All individuals who started to receive wage related UI-benets before3 Dutch unemployment insurance 5
August 11, 2003, were also entitled to extended benets. For the dura-
tion of extended benets, age was the only criterion. For individuals who
became unemployed before the age of 571
2, this duration was equal to 2
years, for older individuals extended benets would last up to 3.5 years. So,
there was a clear age-related discontinuity with a maximum benet dura-
tion of 6 years for workers who became unemployed shortly before turning
571
2 and a maximum benet duration of 7.5 years for workers who became
unemployed shortly after turning 571
2. Therefore, workers who became un-
employed from age 571
2 onwards would therefore receive UI-benets until
the standard retirement age of 65. Thus, UI-benets have in the past been
used as retirement pathway (see Heyma, 2001).
On August 11, 2003 extended benets were abolished. Therefore, the
age-related discontinuity in maximum benet duration disappeared. Irre-
spective of workers became unemployed shortly before or shortly after age
571
2 maximum unemployment benets would be 4 years. Workers who would
become unemployed after age 571
2 would no longer be entitled to receive un-
employment benets until age 65. This would imply that before becoming
entitled to pension benets these workers would have to rely on means-tested
welfare benets. The abolishment of the extended benets was announced
over the weekend and gave employers and workers no time to react to the
change in incentive structure.
3.2 Our data
Our dataset is provided by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) and concerns ad-
ministrative information from municipalities and the organization that is
responsible for the payment of unemployment benets (UWV). The dataset
contains all unemployment spells that started in the calendar years 2001-
2005. For the empirical analysis we only use the unemployment spells of
workers aged between 55 and 59. Furthermore, we only use the inow of
male workers since the number of female workers becoming unemployed in
this age category is rather small.4 Empirical analysis 6
Figure 1 presents the inow into unemployment for 2001-02 and for 2005,
the rst two years and the last year in our sample. As shown in 2001-02
there is a big spike in inow into unemployment for workers aged just above
571
2. In terms of separation rate the level is about 1.7% before the inow
spike, whereas in the inow spike the separation rate doubles to 3.4%. In
2005, when the age-related discontinuity in maximum benet duration was
no longer present there is no clear inow spike at age 571
2.



































4.1 Inﬂow into unemployment
Our dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of workers y in a




where the t (t = 2;3;:::;60) are calendar-month xed eects,  (1,3,...,48)
is an age trend in months from 1 at age 55 and 48 at age 58 and 11 months,
d57:0 5 (d57:6 11) is a dummy variable if the age at inow is between 57 and
571
2 (571
2 and 58), and B is a dummy variable which is 1 when the date of
inow into unemployment was before January 1, 2004. Furthermore, the 's
are parameters and t; is an error term that is assumed to be distributed
i.i.d.
The equation above tests whether there has been a shift in inow, whether
workers are postponing their unemployment for (at least) a couple of months.
However, it may not be the case that workers inuence the timing of their
unemployment by postponing their dismissal, but avoiding their unemploy-
ment altogether. Therefore, we also estimate a restricted model imposing
1 = 3 = 0.
Since the change in maximum benet durations can unexpected we can
analyze its eects as if the change was a natural experiment. Therefore, we
can estimate both equations using OLS. The relevant parameter estimates
are presented in the rst row of Table 1. As shown, before the change in
the benet entitlement rules the inow into unemployment in the 6 months
before age 571
2 is 4.5% lower, while in the 6 months thereafter it is 28.8%
higher. This suggests that part of the inow spike is due to a shift from the
inow shortly before age 571
2 to shortly thereafter. After January 1, 2004
the inow changed a lot. Now, shortly before age 571
2 as well as shortly
thereafter there is a higher inow. Focussing on the post 571
2 inow spike in
the reduced model, we see that it was reduced from 29.4% before January
1, 2004 to 18.3% after January 1, 2004.
Rows 2-4 of Table 1 show the parameter estimates if we use dierent
points in time to indicate the change in potential benet duration. Basically,
the pre benet-change spike is not very much aected by the timing of4 Empirical analysis 8
Tab. 1: Parameter estimates inow into unemployment
Full model Reduced model
Before After Before After
57-57.5 (1) 57.6-58 (3) 57-57.5 (2) 57.6-58 (4) 57.6-58 (3) 57.6-58 (4)
Break January 2004 -0.045*** 0.288*** 0.105*** 0.199*** 0.294*** 0.183***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.030) (0.031) (0.024) (0.030)
Alternative breaks:
September 2003 -0.073*** 0.297*** 0.117*** 0.200*** 0.307*** 0.183***
(0.025) (0.003) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028)
May 2004 -0.025*** 0.294*** 0.009*** 0.167*** 0.297*** 0.153***
(0.023) (0.002) (0.033) (0.034) (0.023) (0.033)
January 2005 -0.006 0.279*** 0.095** 0.140*** 0.298*** 0.126***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.043) (0.044) (0.021) (0.044)
Without the period -0.081*** 0.280*** 0.074** 0.132*** 0.295*** 0.122***
September 2003-August 2004 (0.025) (0.026) (0.035) (0.036) (0.026) (0.035)
Signicance level: *** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%
the break, while the post benet-change spike becomes smaller the later
the timing of the break. Apparently, workers and employers needed some
calendar time to adjust their behavior to the new benet rules.
The bottom row of Table 1 shows the parameter estimates if we ignore
1 year of observations, from September 2003 - August 2004. Again, the
pre benet-change spike is substantial while the post benet-change spike
is substantially smaller. Additional sensitivity analyses are presented in
Appendix B.
4.2 Characteristics of the inﬂow
Clearly, the reduction of the maximum benet duration had an eect on the
inow of workers aged just above 57.5. Apparently, workers have some inu-
ence on the timing of becoming unemployed. To investigate whether some
workers are more inuential than other workers we study the composition
of the inow in terms of personal characteristics.1
Table 7 presents the mean values of the personal characteristics distin-
1 Appendix A provides denitions and information concerning the personal character-
istics.4 Empirical analysis 9
guished by age of inow. As shown the income of the workers gradually
increases with the age of entrance, but this happens both before and after
the reduction in maximum benet duration. Similarly the percentage of
workers being married increases with age, while the percentages of singles
and workers having children that live with them decline with age. The other
personal characteristics are not much correlated with the age of inow into
unemployment.
Tab. 2: Characteristics inow by age of entrance
Before January 2004
Age 55-55.5 55.5-56 56-56.5 56.5-57 57-57.5 57.5-58 58-58.5 58.5-59
Earnings (1000) 9.8 9.8 9.9 10.2 10.5 11.7 11.9 12.1
Weekly hours 35.9 35.4 35.5 35.6 35.6 35.7 35.5 35.5
Married (%) 75.4 76.8 76.8 77.7 76.6 80.2 82.0 82.4
Dutch (%) 93.1 93.3 93.4 94.0 93.2 94.4 93.0 94.3
Single (%) 16.1 15.0 13.8 13.6 14.3 11.8 11.6 11.5
Children (%) 42.7 39.7 37.9 35.0 32.7 30.5 29.3 28.4
Education level (%)
1 12.8 11.7 12.8 12.5 13.9 14.6 15.6 14.0
2 26.6 25.8 26.5 27.8 26.9 29.4 28.6 29.1
3 33.4 34.8 36.5 34.6 34.1 32.8 31.6 31.1
4 16.0 16.1 14.3 15.1 15.6 13.8 14.2 16.0
5 5.4 5.3 4.2 5.0 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.2
After January 2004
Age 55-55.5 55.5-56 56-56.5 56.5-57 57-57.5 57.5-58 58-58.5 58.5-59
Earnings (1000) 10.1 10.2 10.2 10.1 10.5 11.5 10.3 10.0
Weekly hours 35.4 35.5 35.6 35.6 35.5 35.8 35.5 35.7
Married (%) 75.3 75.4 76.9 78.4 76.5 79.9 79.4 79.0
Dutch (%) 91.3 92.4 92.8 92.7 93.1 94.5 94.6 93.9
Single (%) 15.8 16.1 13.3 13.7 15.8 13.8 13.7 13.6
Children (%) 45.5 43.4 40.9 41.4 36.9 33.3 31.3 30.2
Education level (%)
1 11.5 11.5 11.7 10.4 13.0 11.9 12.3 12.7
2 22.8 24.1 25.1 25.2 25.2 25.0 26.9 26.5
3 39.8 39.5 38.7 40.5 38.2 39.4 38.9 37.1
4 15.8 16.0 15.8 15.8 15.2 15.5 14.1 15.6
5 7.0 6.1 6.2 5.1 5.6 5.3 5.1 4.95 Conclusions 10
To investigate whether indeed the characteristics of individuals who en-
ter unemployment shortly after age 57.5 are not dierent from other unem-
ployed we performed regressions using equation (1), replacing the dependent
variable by averages of inow characteristics. The parameter estimates are
presented in Table 3. As shown only income is clearly correlated with the
inow spike. While before the reduction in maximum benet duration the
income of workers aged 57.5-58 at the time of inow was higher than for
other workers, this eect is gone after the reduction in maximum benets.
Apparently, especially high wage workers were able to postpone being dis-
missed until an age at which they could expected to be eligible for benets
until age 65.
Tab. 3: Parameter estimates characteristics of the inow
Before After Before After
1 3 2 4 3 4
log(Earnings) -0.0351* 0.0970*** -0.0073 -0.0096 0.0055*** -0.0073
(0.0174) (0.0178) (0.0316) (0.0319) (0.0004) (0.0315)
Weekly hours -0.0776 0.1514 0.0243 0.2328 0.1523 0.2292
(0.1431) (0.1461) (0.1810) (0.1834) (0.1440) (0.1810)
Married -0.0285*** -0.0002 -0.0234** 0.0071 0.0051 0.0116
(0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0087) (0.0110)
Single -0.0022 0.0040 0.0069 0.0074 0.0042 0.0064
(0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0053) (0.0067)
Single 0.0113 -0.0076 0.0189** -0.0032 -0.0098 -0.0065
(0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0089) (0.0090) (0.0071) (0.0089)
Children -0.0035 -0.0068 0.0051 -0.0001 -0.0063 -0.0009
(0.0989) (0.0101) (-0.0125) (0.0201) (0.0099) (0.0125)
Higher educated 0.0001 -0.0109 0.0040 -0.0000 -0.0109 -0.0006
(Education level  4) (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0083) (0.0104)
Signicance level: *** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%
5 Conclusions
In The Netherlands, extreme long benet durations after age 57.5 provided
incentives for workers to enter unemployment after that age and conse-
quently receive benets until age 65. When this incentive that allowed5 Conclusions 11
workers to `retire early' was abolished in August 2003, the age-specic inow
spike disappeared gradually. Apparently, workers had some inuence on the
timing of their unemployment spell and when possible they use this inu-
ence to their advantage. Especially high wage workers were able to exploit
the characteristics of the unemployment benet system.
We can only speculate about the mechanism through which the worker
can inuence the date at which he is red. Workers put in eort in their
job and are red when their eort is below a certain minimum. Or workers
are red when there is a downturn in a rm's business. There are two types
of arguments that can explain the spike in the inow into unemployment.
First, from a rm's perspective it may become less costly to re a worker
shortly after age 57.5 rather than shortly before, since the worker may not
have an incentive to ght the dismissal as hard as when the worker does
not have a possibility to retire with unemployment benets. The worker
can for instance promise to refrain from going to court to ght the dismissal
in exchange for the employer promising to wait with ring the worker until
he turns 57.5. And second it is possible that the eort level of the worker
becomes lower when the worker has reached age 57.5 because unemploy-
ment becomes a more attractive labor market state. All in all, it is clear
that workers have been using the unemployment benet system to their
advantage.5 Conclusions 12
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Appendix A: Deﬁnitions of personal characteristics
Table 4 gives an overview of the personal characteristics used in the analysis.
Tab. 4: Denitions of personal characteristics
Variable Contains Min Max Mean
Earnings Annual earnings (Euros) 1 149736 10650
Weekly hours Number of weekly working hours prior to
unemployment
1 80 34.56
Married 1 if worker is married 0 1 0.78
Dutch 1 if worker has only Dutch nationality 0 1 0.93
Single 1 if worker is in a one person household 0 1 0.14
Children 1 if there are children in the worker's
household
0 1 0.34
Education level 1 Primary school 0 1 0.13
Education level 2 Lower vocational education 0 1 0.27
Education level 3 Middle vocational education/secondary
school
0 1 0.36
Education level 4 Higher vocational education/Bachelor 0 1 0.15
Education level 5 Master 0 1 0.05
Appendix B: Additional sensitivity analysis
B-1 Age ﬁxed effects
By way of sensitivity analysis we replaced the age trend term in equation
(1) by age xed eects:
logyt; = t +  + (1   Bt) + t; (2)
where the  ( = 2;3;:::;48) are age category xed eects. The  parame-
ters show the relative inow into unemployment before January 2004. The
 parameters show the dierence between before and after the reduction of
the benet duration.
Without incentive eects, we would expect that, if labor productivity
does not signicantly change between the ages 55 and 59, the  parameter
were negative if at all signicant. When more workers retire, the population
that is at risk of being red decreases. Furthermore, if the abolishment of5 Conclusions 14
the extended benets would have no eect, then the  parameters should be
insignicantly dierent from zero.
Table 5 and 6 presents all parameter estimates. The  parameters in-
crease just after the age of 57.5. The parameters of interest are signicantly
dierent from zero, while the parameters just before 57.5 and after 57.9,
are usually insignicantly dierent from 0. The fact that the spike partly
disappears is shown in the -estimates. These parameters are signicantly
dierent from zero where the pre-change spike is largest. However, when we
test whether the spike completely disappears, the parameters combined are
still signicant.
In the top graph of Figure 2 we show the regression parameters in the
following way. The  parameters show the inow before January 2004. The
sum of the  and  parameters present the situation after January 2004.
When we take a look at the graph, we see that there are two interesting
things going on with workers around the age of 57.5. Before January 2004
there is clearly a spike in unemployment inow for workers just after the age
of 57.5. We see that the spike has mostly disappeared after January 2004.
The bottom graph of Figure 2 plots the parameter estimates if we remove
one year of observations from the sample. Basically, the results are almost
identical to the ones in the top graph.
B2 Inﬂow elasticity
Our analysis uses a natural experiment driven change in an age-related dis-
continuity in maximum unemployment benet duration. Without further
assumptions the policy change does not allow us to establish an inow elas-
ticity of the maximum benet duration, i.e. the percentage reduction in the
inow into unemployment due to the reduction in potential benet dura-
tion. The change in age-specic inow over time is inuenced by changes in
the maximum benet duration but also by changes in the state of the labor
market. To give an idea about the potential size of the inow elasticity we5 Conclusions 15
estimated the following relationship:
logyt; = 0 +1ut +2 logTt; +3t+(1d57:0 5 +2d57:6 11)Bt +t; (3)
where ut is the national unemployment rate in calendar month t and Tt; is
the maximum benet duration in calendar month t for age-of-inow group
. The parameter 1 measures the eect of the cycle on the inow, 2 in
the inow elasticity of benet duration and 3 represent a calendar time
trend. The parameter estimates are presented in Table ??. As expected
the economic cycle represented by the national unemployment rate has a
signicant positive eect on the unemployment inow. There is also a neg-
ative calendar time trend aecting the inow into unemployment. Without
the time trend the eect of the unemployment rate is bigger, showing that
the unemployment rate has a trend-like development over the period of our
analysis.
The main parameter of interest, the inow elasticity with respect to
maximum benet duration is signicantly dierent from zero with a value
of approximately 0.40{0.45.5 Conclusions 16
Tab. 5: Full list of  parameters for the January 2004 estimation
Var Coef SE Sig Var Coef SE Sig
2 0.072 0.0658 32 0.167 0.0658 **
3 0.133 0.0658 ** 33 0.416 0.0658 ***
4 -0.272 0.0658 *** 34 0.593 0.0658 ***
5 -0.015 0.0658 35 0.429 0.0658 ***
6 -0.304 0.0658 *** 36 0.382 0.0658 ***
7 -0.200 0.0658 *** 37 0.619 0.0658 ***
8 -0.253 0.0658 *** 38 0.449 0.1073 ***
9 -0.389 0.0658 *** 39 0.405 0.1073 ***
10 -0.197 0.0658 *** 40 0.560 0.1073 ***
11 -0.017 0.0658 41 0.128 0.1073
12 -0.537 0.0658 *** 42 0.386 0.1073 ***
13 0.576 0.0658 *** 43 0.612 0.1073 ***
14 0.153 0.0658 ** 44 0.042 0.1073
15 0.100 0.0658 45 0.251 0.1073 **
16 0.137 0.0658 ** 46 0.488 0.1073 ***
17 0.206 0.0658 *** 47 0.243 0.1073 **
18 -0.048 0.0658 48 0.598 0.1073 ***
19 0.051 0.0658 49 0.638 0.1073 ***
20 0.164 0.0658 ** 50 0.498 0.1073 ***
21 0.013 0.0658 51 0.643 0.1073 ***
22 0.344 0.0658 *** 52 0.429 0.1073 ***
23 0.147 0.0658 ** 53 0.110 0.1073
24 -0.099 0.0658 54 0.387 0.1073 ***
25 0.720 0.0658 *** 55 0.050 0.1073
26 0.373 0.0658 *** 56 -0.020 0.1073
27 0.278 0.0658 *** 57 0.265 0.1073 **
28 0.220 0.0658 *** 58 0.022 0.1073
29 0.507 0.0658 *** 59 0.007 0.1073
30 0.170 0.0658 ** 60 0.474 0.1073 ***
31 0.514 0.0658 ***
Signicance level: *** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%5 Conclusions 17
Tab. 6: Full list of  and  parameters for the January 2004 estimation
Var Coef SE Sig Var Coef SE Sig
2 0.158 0.0749 ** 2 -0.045 0.1210
3 0.247 0.0749 *** 3 -0.156 0.1210
4 0.130 0.0749 * 4 -0.061 0.1210
5 0.200 0.0749 *** 5 -0.095 0.1210
6 0.135 0.0749 * 6 -0.139 0.1210
7 0.064 0.0749 7 -0.037 0.1210
8 0.005 0.0749 8 -0.045 0.1210
9 0.068 0.0749 9 -0.135 0.1210
10 0.095 0.0749 10 -0.099 0.1210
11 0.070 0.0749 11 -0.183 0.1210
12 0.045 0.0749 12 -0.041 0.1210
13 0.088 0.0749 13 -0.097 0.1210
14 0.058 0.0749 14 -0.006 0.1210
15 0.070 0.0749 15 -0.034 0.1210
16 0.018 0.0749 16 0.021 0.1210
17 -0.027 0.0749 17 0.069 0.1210
18 0.017 0.0749 18 0.013 0.1210
19 -0.053 0.0749 19 0.047 0.1210
20 0.002 0.0749 20 -0.025 0.1210
21 0.103 0.0749 21 -0.019 0.1210
22 -0.042 0.0749 22 -0.047 0.1210
23 0.037 0.0749 23 0.058 0.1210
24 -0.061 0.0749 24 -0.073 0.1210
25 -0.023 0.0749 25 0.045 0.1210
26 -0.024 0.0749 26 0.157 0.1210
27 -0.022 0.0749 27 0.160 0.1210
28 -0.055 0.0749 28 0.071 0.1210
29 -0.047 0.0749 29 0.100 0.1210
30 0.019 0.0749 30 0.105 0.1210
31 0.026 0.0749 31 0.043 0.1210
32 0.442 0.0749 *** 32 -0.276 0.1210 **
33 0.516 0.0749 *** 33 -0.260 0.1210 **
34 0.328 0.0749 *** 34 -0.194 0.1210
35 0.243 0.0749 *** 35 -0.060 0.1210
36 0.125 0.0749 * 36 0.035 0.1210
37 0.140 0.0749 * 37 -0.035 0.1210
38 0.051 0.0749 38 0.168 0.1210
39 0.181 0.0749 ** 39 0.007 0.1210
40 0.147 0.0749 ** 40 -0.100 0.1210
41 0.087 0.0749 41 -0.049 0.1210
42 0.040 0.0749 42 -0.062 0.1210
43 -0.049 0.0749 43 -0.057 0.1210
44 0.028 0.0749 44 0.007 0.1210
45 -0.044 0.0749 45 -0.026 0.1210
46 0.038 0.0749 46 -0.256 0.1210 **
47 -0.117 0.0749 47 -0.021 0.1210
48 -0.208 0.0749 *** 48 -0.073 0.1210
constant 2.391 0.0701 ***
Signicance level: *** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%5 Conclusions 18
Tab. 7: Parameter estimates inow elasticities
ut Tt; t
1 2 3 1 2
a. Baseline
(Break January 2004) 0.350*** 0.371*** -0.005*** -0.031 0.230***
(0.019) (0.058) (0.001) (0.028) (0.030)
0.294*** 0.446*** { -0.021 0.228***
(0.015) (0.056) { (0.028) (0.030)
Alternative breaks
b. September 2003 0.349*** 0.352*** -0.005*** -0.081*** 0.235***
(0.019) (0.059) (0.001) (0.030) (0.032)
0.290*** 0.437*** { -0.075*** 0.225***
(0.015) (0.057) { (0.030) (0.032)
c. May 2004 0.344*** 0.372*** -0.004*** -0.010 0.243***
(0.019) (0.057) (0.001) (0.027) (0.028)
0.292*** 0.438*** { 0.002 0.247***
(0.014) (0.055) { (0.027) (0.028)
d. January 2005 0.340*** 0.394*** -0.004*** -0.008 0.216***
(0.014) (0.057) (0.001) (0.025) (0.025)
0.291*** 0.456*** { 0.005 0.222***
(0.014) (0.055) { (0.024) (0.025)
e. Without the period
Sept. 2003{August 2004 0.320*** 0.552*** -0.001 -0.067** 0.213***
(0.022) (0.065) (0.001) (0.030) (0.032)
0.302*** 0.586*** { -0.065** 0.209***
(0.015) (0.059) { (0.030) (0.032)5 Conclusions 19
Fig. 2: Graph of parameter estimates { Before (black) and after (grey) Jan-
uary 2004












































55.0 55.5 56.0 56.5 57.0 57.5 58.0 58.5
Age
P
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s